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CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY CHOICE AGGREGATION LAW & 
REGULATION 
 
Ryan M. F. Baron, Glen Price, and Benjamin Bodell† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this special topic is to provide a summary of the 
laws and regulations associated with the development of Community 
Choice Aggregation (“CCA”) in California and the growing impact of 
CCA in the California energy market.  
In 2000–2001, California experienced a devastating energy crisis 
due to deregulation, capped electricity prices, a shortage of supply, 
and market manipulation, resulting in multiple large-scale blackouts 
and extreme prices. In response to the crisis, the California Legislature 
passed several bills to bring order to California’s energy markets. The 
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choice aggregation1—that allows California cities and counties, and 
groups of cities and counties through separate local government 
agencies known as “joint powers authorities,”2 to opt their residents 
and commercial and industrial businesses out of receiving retail 
electricity from the investor owned utility (“IOU”) and directly control 
and provide retail power at the local level.3 This legislation sparked a 
significant movement by local governments in California to provide 
retail electricity to their residents and businesses without having to 
form municipal utilities and take over the IOU transmission and 
distribution system. 
CCA allows local agencies to aggregate the electric load of its 
jurisdiction and provide electricity to those residents, businesses, and 
municipal accounts within the CCA’s municipal boundaries. Under 
the CCA model, local government entities take over the retail function 
of an electric utility by procuring and generating power and providing 
it to ratepayers, while IOUs continue to provide electric transmission, 
distribution, utility line maintenance, and metering and billing 
services. The CCA model offers a new entry point into the California 
energy landscape for cities and communities while providing 
consumer choice,4 competitive rates, local control, economic 
development, and climate-related benefits by increasing the 
development of renewable energy, particularly in a market that has 
been traditionally controlled by vertically integrated, natural 
monopolies. 
Recent innovations in energy technology and resultant lower costs, 
as well as incremental policies encouraging renewable energy 
resource adoption, have led California on a path towards a diversified 
market for consumer electric services.5 The California Public Utilities 
Commission (“CPUC”) estimated that within the next decade over 
85% of retail load in California will be served by alternative sources.6 
 
 1. AB 117, 2001-2002 Leg. Sess. (Ca. 2002); see Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 366.2. 
Community choice aggregation is more popularly known as community choice 
energy. 
 2. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6500 (2012) (California Joint Exercise of Powers Act). 
 3. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 366.2 (2020). 
 4. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 366.2(c)(13) (2020). Consumer choice is provided 
by allowing the CCA customer the ability to opt out of service and return to IOU 
service.  
 5. Rooftop solar, Community Choice Aggregators (CCAs) and Direct Access 
providers (ESPs), which are effectively non-IOU unbundled providers, served over 
25% of California’s retail electric load in 2019 and 2020. 
 6. Robert Walton, California PUC Staff: Non-Utility Suppliers Could Serve 
85% of Load by Mid-2020s, UTILITYDIVE (May 17, 2017), 
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California faces numerous challenges and opportunities in developing 
a coherent plan to integrate and manage the growth of CCAs and 
diversified energy provision, including renewable procurement rules, 
resource adequacy requirements, and consumer protection. 
II. EVOLVING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
In 2010, Marin Clean Energy (MCE) launched the first CCA in 
California,7 and Sonoma Clean Power followed suit in 2014.8 These 
and other CCAs demonstrated a model that has the potential to yield 
substantial benefits to communities and customers, including reduced 
prices and higher rates of renewable resource utilization. As a result, 
CCA formation increased dramatically across California in recent 
years, with many new CCAs launching throughout the state. 
Twenty-one CCAs now exist in the territory of the three major IOUs 
in California,9 with many additional communities planning formation 
or investigating membership.10 As of September 2020, these twenty-
one CCAs account for nearly ten million customer accounts, an 
increase of approximately 40% since the end of 2017.11 
The rapid departure of IOU customers to CCAs led the CPUC to 
adopt CCA registration timelines and requirements that CCAs 
participate in state energy planning proceedings to ensure grid 
reliability and the fair allocation of capacity obligations. Other issues 
also exist, such as the increasing volatility of utility “exit fees” and 





 7. Alexandra McGee, Marin Clean Energy Startup Timeline and Funding, 
MCE (February 8, 2016), https://www.mcecleanenergy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/MCE-Start-Up-Timeline-and-Initial-Funding-Sources-10-
6-14-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK3N-K2N9]. 
 8. Sonoma Clean Power Officially “Flips the Switch”, SONOMA CLEAN POWER 
(May 1, 2014), https://sonomacleanpower.org/uploads/documents/Sonoma-Clean-
Power-Begins-Serving-Customers-050114-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/72ND-
LFWR]. 
 9. This includes Pacific Gas & Electric, Southern California Edison, and San 
Diego Gas & Electric. 2010-2020: A Decade of CCA in California, CALCCA (May 
1, 2020), httpsa://cal-cca.org/celebrating-10-years-of-cca-in-california/ 
[https://perma.cc/9WST-YNR6].  
 10. CALCCA, https://cal-cca.org/ [https://perma.cc/SFG2-BP9T] (last visited 
Jan. 19, 2020). 
 11. Id. 
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A. Renewable Resource Integration & California Regulatory Policy 
While deregulation coupled with market fragmentation has the 
potential to lead to another energy crisis,12 the CPUC has taken an 
aggressive stance towards CCA regulation through a broad 
interpretation of its duty to regulate CCAs under the Public Utilities 
Code. California Public Utility Code Section 366.2 forms the statutory 
framework for CCA regulation by the CPUC and pronounces that 
CCAs have the independent authority to procure electricity for its 
jurisdictional customers.13 However, a CCA must submit an 
implementation plan to the CPUC, which demonstrates the ability to 
provide reliable, universal service in conformance with all state 
laws.14 Furthermore, the CPUC is vested with the duty to prevent cost 
shifting and promote ratepayer indifference by ensuring that CCA 
customer departure does not increase costs for customers that remain 
with the IOU and that the IOUs do not improperly pass along costs to 
CCA customers that should stay with the IOUs.15  
1. Resource Adequacy and CCA Implementation 
The CPUC’s resource adequacy mandates require all load-serving 
entities (electricity providers), which includes CCAs, to procure 
sufficient capacity to supply electricity to all of their customers during 
periods of maximum electricity demand for the upcoming year. 
Because electricity demand (including peak demand) fluctuates, 
electricity providers must ensure that a cushion amount of electricity 
(a “reserve margin”) is capable of being generated at any given time, 
even though it might not be needed. The purpose of resource adequacy 
is to provide an additional safety net in the event of an unforeseen 
spike in power demand. Thus, all electricity providers must obtain 
capacity commitments that are greater than peak electricity demand.16  
 
 12. See e.g., MICHAEL COLVIN, DIANE I. FELLMAN, RAISA LEDESMA 
RODRIGUEZ, CPUC STAFF, CALIFORNIA CUSTOMER CHOICE: AN EVALUATION OF 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OPTIONS FOR AN EVOLVING ELECTRICITY MARKET 
(Rohimah Moly ed.) (2018). 
 13. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 366.2(a) (2019). 
 14. § 366.2(c) 
 15. § 366.2(a), (c) (2019). 
 16. PUB. UTILITIES COMM’N, DECISION 04-01-050, at pp. 20-27, ORDER 
INSTITUTING RULEMAKING TO ESTABLISH POLICIES AND COST RECOVERY 
MECHANISMS FOR GENERATION PROCUREMENT AND RENEWABLE RESOURCE 
DEVELOPMENT (2001) (CPUC Policy Requires LSE’s to secure Capacity 
commitments 15% greater than peak load.) 
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The surge of CCA formation since 2016 has shifted load from IOUs 
to CCAs in rapid fashion.17 In addressing the rapid expansion of 
CCAs, the CPUC now requires CCAs to submit load forecasts and 
year ahead resource adequacy filings if they plan to serve new or 
additional load in the subsequent calendar year.18 The CPUC also 
mandated a longer resource adequacy procurement cycle, which 
requires all electricity providers to procure a certain percentage of 
local resource commitments up to three years ahead at the beginning 
of each cycle. This long-term procurement cycle, in which the CPUC 
proposes to utilize an independent buyer, will presumably impose 
additional costs on all electricity providers and strip CCAs of some of 
their independent energy procurement authority.19 
2. Energy Procurement and Resource Planning Regulations 
a. Renewables Portfolio Standard Procurement Plans 
CCAs must file Renewables Portfolio Standard (“RPS”) 
procurement plans with the CPUC that demonstrate compliance with 
the state’s renewable energy targets under Senate Bill 350. CCA RPS 
procurement plans must include project status and progress updates, 
notice of potential compliance delays, and an assessment of portfolio 
diversity as it relates to grid integration and under-utilization of 
 
 17. See Jeff St. John, How Community Choice Aggregation Fits Into California’s 




 18. CPUC Proposal Would Require CCAs to Coordinate with Resource 
Adequacy Program, California Public Utilities Commission News Blog (Feb. 5, 
2018), https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/cpucblog.aspx?id=6442455641&blogid=1551 
[https://perma.cc/W3KZ-MZXH]. 
 19. PUB. UTILITIES COMM’N, DECISION 18-06-030, at 32, ORDER INSTITUTING 
RULEMAKING TO OVERSEE THE RESOURCE ADEQUACY PROGRAM, CONSIDER 
PROGRAM REFINEMENTS, AND ESTABLISH ANNUAL LOCAL AND FLEXIBLE 
PROCUREMENT OBLIGATIONS FOR THE 2019 AND 2020 COMPLIANCE YEARS (2018) 
(“Weighing both the concerns and the potential benefits of moving to a central buyer 
system, we believe that a central buyer system - for at least some portion of local 
RA - is the solution most likely to provide cost efficiency, market certainty, 
reliability, administrative efficiency, and customer protection . . . central 
procurement of system or flexible RA may be considered in future years.”); MEGAN 
SOMOGYI ET AL., New CPUC Regulation of Community Choice Aggregators, 
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renewable resources.20 Plans should also demonstrate how RPS 
portfolios optimize cost consideration, value, and risk for the benefit 
of customers.21  
b. Integrated Resource Plans 
CCAs must comply with the long-term energy planning mandates 
under SB 350 by filing an integrated resource plan (“IRP”) with the 
CPUC.22 The CPUC’s integrated resource planning process takes a 
long-term (ten years) planning approach to system needs (reliability 
needs of the overall electric system), local needs (reliability needs 
specific to areas with transmission limitations), and flexibility needs 
(such as the resources needed to integrate renewables). The 
Commission requires IRP plans to ensure long-term portfolio 
optimization that balances greenhouse gas reduction with cost and 
reliability considerations. In a recent determination, the CPUC held 
that CCAs must substantively comply with state IRP requirements.23  
B. Additional Legal and Financial Considerations 
1. The Power Charge Indifference Adjustment 
On October 11, 2018, the CPUC unanimously adopted a 
precedential decision reforming the power charge indifference 
adjustment (“PCIA”) methodology. The PCIA is a methodology used 
by the IOUs to determine the “exit fee” or charge customers of CCAs 
and other departing load customers pay to cover the generation costs 
acquired before the customers’ change in service provider. State law 
requires that customers of IOUs and CCAs remain financially 
 
 20. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.13 (2020); PUB. UTILITIES COMM’N, DECISION 
R.15-02-020, at 9, ORDER INSTITUTING RULEMAKING TO CONTINUE 
IMPLEMENTATION AND ADMINISTRATION, AND CONSIDER FURTHER DEVELOPMENT, 
OF CALIFORNIA RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD PROGRAM (2018).   
 21. Id. 
 22. PUB. UTILITIES COMM’N, DECISION 18-02-018 at pp. 25-29, ORDER 
INSTITUTING RULEMAKING TO DEVELOP AN ELECTRICITY INTEGRATED RESOURCE 
PLANNING FRAMEWORK AND TO COORDINATE AND REFINE LONG-TERM 
PROCUREMENT PLANNING REQUIREMENTS (2018) (“We maintain that our authority 
and responsibility over CCA planning is considerably broader than the CCAs and 
their representatives argue.”). 
 23. Id. at 26. Moreover, the Commission determined that if a CCA does not meet 
the statutory or Commission requirements, it has the authority to order long-term 
procurement commitments, and to assign costs of non-performance to meet the 
identified needs for renewable integration in accordance with Public Utility Code 
Section 454.51. 
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indifferent when a customer departs for the service of another 
electricity provider. Currently, customers that choose to take service 
with a CCA pay a charge on their electric bill to offset the costs that 
the IOU has incurred on that customer’s behalf. This practice prevents 
cost shifting and ensures that remaining IOU-bundled customers are 
indifferent to and do not incur additional costs due to departing load. 
The PCIA also prevents IOUs from unfairly shifting costs to CCA 
customers.  
The IOUs’ PCIA-eligible portfolios are made up of both capital 
expenditures for retired nuclear and fossil fuel generation as well as 
long-term contracts for renewable energy executed during the infancy 
of the California renewables market. Increased market scale and 
technological advancements caused a steep drop in the cost of 
renewable resources in the past decade. Older contracts (and their 
related PCIA costs) come at a substantial mark up from today’s market 
prices.  
In a unanimous decision, the five CPUC Commissioners adopted a 
PCIA calculation methodology that allows IOU legacy generation 
assets, like Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant and hydroelectric 
facilities, to be included in the PCIA methodology. The PCIA decision 
also included true-up mechanism for PCIA collections based on the 
actual net costs of IOU resources and rejected a ten-year limit on 
recovery of post-2002 UOG assets, which would have limited IOU 
cost recovery. The adopted PCIA will result in hundreds of millions 
of dollars in additional costs to CCA customers.  
Creditworthiness is also a substantial hurdle to long-term energy 
procurement for CCAs, and Credit Rating Agencies have taken note 
of the risks created by the PCIA decision. In 2020, CCAs will need to 
procure a significant amount of power through long-term contracts of 
ten or more years, as required by state law, to hedge against 
uncertainty and potential market volatility. With the recent PCIA 
decision squeezing out some of the savings to the customer along with 
credit constraints resulting from the COVID-19 international 
pandemic, it may be difficult in the short-term for some CCAs to 
generate the reserve margins required to establish a favorable credit 
rating and obtain credit at reasonable rates. 
 
